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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
The horrors of the 20th century are many. Acts of mass violence have taken place in so many
countries and on so many occasions it is hard to comprehend. According to some estimates,
nearly 170 million civilians have been subjected to genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity during the past century.1 The World Wars lead the world community to pledge that
“never again” would anything similar occur. But the shocking acts of the Nazis were not isolated
incidents, which we have since consigned to history. Hundreds of thousands and in some cases
millions of people have been murdered in, among others, Russia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Sierra
Leone, Chile, the Philippines, the Congo, Bangladesh, Uganda, Iraq, Indonesia, East Timor, El
Salvador, Burundi, Argentina, Somalia, Chad, Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the second half of the
past century2. But what is possibly even sadder is that we, meaning the world community, have
witnessed these massacres passively and stood idle and inactive. The result is that in almost every
case in history, the dictator/president/head of state/military leader responsible for carrying out
these atrocities has escaped punishment, justice and even censure. The genocide in Rwanda
during 1994 later led to the creation of an international criminal tribunal3, which constitute a
major breakthrough in international criminal law, but is yet another tragic example of how the
world community chose to turn a blind eye to despicable acts. In spite of accurate and reliable
information regarding what was about to happen in Rwanda, the UN and its member-states did
not interfere to prevent the catastrophe. Not even when the genocide was under way did the world
community intervene. In 100 days, members of the ruling Hutu tribe murdered among 800 000
members of the Tutsi tribe in mass executions.4
In the summer of 1998, the world community gathered in Rome for a major diplomatic
conference sponsored by the United Nations. A statute was negotiated for the creation of what
could be one of the century’s most significant institutions: an international criminal court (the
                                                           
1 White, Jamison G.,‘Nowhere to run, Nowhere to hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, the ICC, and a
Wake-up Call for Former Heads of State’, 1999 and Scharf, Michael P., ‘Results of the Rome Conference for an
International Criminal Court’, 1998.
2 King, Henry T., and Theofrastous, Theodore C., ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign
Policy’, 1999, and Penrose, Mary Margaret, ‘It’s Good to Be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former
Heads of State Under International Law’, 2000.
3 The genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia led to the UN Security Council’s establishment
of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICTR and the ICTY respectively.
ICC)5 with seemingly broad jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators of the world’s gravest crimes.
At the end of the conference the statute6 for this unprecedented permanent administrator of
criminal justice was adopted by a large majority of states, 120 voted for the court’s establishment,
seven voted against and 21 abstained. In spite of overwhelming global support, the world’s only
superpower voted against the ICC. In opposing the statute’s adoption, the USA joined a rather
strange group of allies that included China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar and Yemen.7
The USA raises persistent arguments against the ICC and its statute, even though substantive
provisions of the convention represent major concessions to US concerns expressed before and
during the negotiations. Essentially, the USA is not prepared to accept the jurisdiction of an
international criminal court over American citizens. The US opposition is regrettable because the
ICC is founded – through the Rome-treaty – on state co-operation and would suffer gravely from
a lack of participation. It is vital for the Court’s future effectiveness that it is met with global co-
operation and commitment. If key states do not support the Court in the future it will face
insurmountable problems as it seeks to investigate international crimes and bring the perpetrators
to justice. The Statute is not perfect and many states voiced disappointment over this and that
inclusion or exclusion, but it would be hard to expect more of an international negotiated
institution. Scheffer, who is the US Ambassador at large for war crimes issues and led the US
delegation at Rome, writes that “the US delegation was not prepared at any time during the Rome
Conference to accept a treaty text that represented a political compromise on fundamental issues
of international criminal law and international peace and security”.8 The ICC is a global solution
and consequently a compromise between a mosaic of different wills. But the aims that drive the
creation and design of the ICC are fundamentally important. As we shall see, there are many
situations in which an international criminal court would be the only meaningful forum for
pursuing justice for the gravest atrocities in the world. The dilemma with an institution like the
ICC stems from the conflict between needs of sufficient powers to bring the perpetrators of
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression to justice, and the reluctance of
                                                                                                                                                                                               
4 Penrose, Mary Margaret, ‘Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law’, 2000.
5 The International Criminal Court will in this essay be referred to as the ICC or the Court.
6 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 (1998). It will in this essay be
referred to as the Rome Statute or the Statute.
7 Scharf, ‘Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal Court’.
8 Scheffer, David J., ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’, 1999, p. 17.
nation-states to give up the necessary autonomy. On the point of US opposition one author writes:
“Any state actor who prefers the somewhat anarchical system of effectively unenforceable
international law to a structured, independent tribunal with enforcement power would likely see
the court as a direct threat to its national sovereignty”.9
1.2. Purpose
This essay will show that the ICC, as founded in the Rome Statute, is in a critical position. The
authors of the treaty did their best to establish a court with sufficient powers and managed to
avoid a requirement of formal state consent to the court’s jurisdiction on every occasion.
Nevertheless the ICC is overly dependent on state co-operation for matters like arrests and
gathering of evidence. For states to be encouraged to co-operate, the institutions of international
law need legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects – the states. One component of legitimacy is the
effectiveness of the institution, which in turn depends upon state co-operation. This creates a
precarious “feedback loop”: effectiveness encourages legitimacy, which encourages state co-
operation, which increases effectiveness and so on. It is important that the ICC is as effective as
possible from the beginning, otherwise it will not acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the
international community and states will not be willing to fully support and co-operate with the
institution. There would then be a real risk that it would wind away into semi-irrelevance. The
position of the USA as the world’s only superpower is of crucial importance for the future of the
ICC10.
1.3. Disposition
This study will show that in order for the ICC to become a practical success, states need to
consider the Court as legitimate. Overall the essay will analyse the probability of the ICC to
become an effective adjudicator of international criminal law and gain the amount of global
support it needs to perform its duties in a meaningful fashion. The paper begins with addressing
international law in general and its historical evolution. This will be followed by a consideration
of the idea to create an international criminal court, looking at its predecessors and their legacy.
The essay will then present several important principles of international criminal law, state
                                                           
9 King and Theofrastous, ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy’.
10 Compare with the League of Nations. The fact that the USA never joined or supported the League of Nations
definitely contributed to the institution’s failure and demise.
practice as of today and the problem with enforcement on the interstate level. Thereafter the
nature of institutions’ legitimacy will be examined, before the description turns to the overall
organisation and operating principles of the Court. The focus will be on the provisions regulating
jurisdiction and how it is triggered as well as the expected UN Security Council (SC) impact. In
connection with discussing the different parts of the Statute the note will evaluate the significance
of US objections and the consequences of US non-participation in the Court. Finally this note will
be concluded by an examination of the possibility of international crimes leading to prosecutions
before the Court, using the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia as a case study, followed by an
analysis and concluding remarks.
1.4. The Current Situation
The ICC’s statute is currently open for ratification. Before ratification, each state has to ensure
that its legislation complies with the Rome Treaty. Only recently Great Britain became the 42nd
country in the world and the 13th European Union country to ratify the treaty establishing the
International Criminal Court11. The treaty that will become operative when ratified by 60 states,
was entered into by Sweden on June 28, 2001.12 Amongst Western nations the USA is almost the
only one refusing to ratify the treaty. Some 130 countries have signed the treaty, including the
USA that signed through former President Bill Clinton on New Year’s Eve 2000 -the last day of
eligibility- to assure US involvement in setting up the Court; for example assisting in the
remaining drafting and nominating judges. Israel and Iran signed the same day. Many welcomed
the British ratification and hope that it will put additional pressure on the United States to bring
its policy into line with that of its European allies.13 The European Union has strongly supported
the establishment of the ICC. The remaining 18 ratifications are expected by mid-2002 which is
earlier than originally anticipated. After the British decision, Ireland, Greece and Portugal are the
only EU countries left to ratify the treaty.14
                                                           
11 As of October 4, 2001.
12 Lagrådsremissen ‘Sveriges samarbete med internationella brottmålsdomstolen’, Stockholm October 4 2001, p. 22-
23. (See prop. 2000/01:122, bet. 2000/01:JuU30 and 2000/01:KU13y, rskr. 2000/01:284). In Sweden’s case, this has
evolved into the processing of one new law and changes in four already existing ones, that ensure that Swedish
legislation will be compatible with the ICC Statute.
13 Wergeni, Cecilia, ‘Får vi en ny internationell brottmålsdomstol?’, 2001; ’Britain Ratifies Treaty Creating
Criminal Court –U.S. Isolated in Opposition to World Body’, International Herald Tribune, Frankfurt October 5
2001, and Aftonbladet (kultur), October 27 2001, p. 5.
2. LAW IN THE INTERSTATE SYSTEM
2.1. The Evolution of International Law and International Criminal Law
International Law works in a context of a wide range of independent nations and their domestic
law systems, constituting the law of the international system of nation states. Like all legal
systems in the world, it reflects the politics and values of the socio-political system it attempts to
regulate. This means that International Law has changed through the decades in response to and
because of the different prevailing political, ideological and economic powers. It has lived
through two world wars and their aftermath’, recurrent world wide economic crisis and the
ideological division of the world by the two nuclear-armed superpowers. When the international
system dramatically changed with the end of the cold war in the late 1980s, due to the Western
“victory” over the Communist world and collapse of the Soviet Union, threats of nuclear wars
and the ideological hostility withered. The transformed world-order, dominated by new political
forces, has brought change in International Law and its values. We are no longer living in a
bipolar system but in a system of coexisting independent states, generally triggered as much by
economic influences as by political, which strongly encourages over-border collaboration.15
Some thinkers of the positivist school have opposed International law on the grounds that it
cannot be law since it lacks a higher source of legitimate law-making power and enforcement. A
sub-argument to this looks at the key elements of domestic rule of law systems and searches for
the same elements in international law. This argument says that “international law is not law
because the international system has no government and no institutions of government on which
law depends, no legislature to make law, no executive to enforce it, no judiciary to resolve
disputes and develop the law”16 and we might add, no constitution to police it. It is true that the
international system lacks those institutions, but that there cannot be law without them is not true.
Law is still made, through unanimous agreements between the nation states (instead through
majority votes by a legislative body representing the states17) and functions connected with
                                                                                                                                                                                               
14 Ibid.
15 Henkin, Louis, ‘International Law: Politics and Values’, 1995, p. 1.
16 Ibid p. 3-4.
17 States have consented to law making by a representative body in some matters, for example the Security Council
(Charter of the United Nations (1945), chapters. V-VII).
governance under a legal system are taking place; there is neither executive nor courts but the law
is generally enforced and followed.18
International Criminal Law as a concept has existed between nations-states for centuries. Its
function is to regulate and prevent criminal international violations, thereby securing and
maintaining international legal order and peace.19 Historically, for activities to be considered
international crimes they had to violate domestic regulations. Malekian writes: “[i]t may be
possible to conclude that the basis of international criminal law is the evolution and enforcement
of the concept of domestic criminal law. Criminals were extradited to a large extent in order that
domestic criminal law be effectively implemented.” This co-operation resulted in, e.g., the
conclusion of numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties for the extradition of criminals.20
International humanitarian law took its modern form after World War II in order to create a
deterrent to the repeat of the horrors that took place in the trenches and concentration camps.
Important conventions were agreed on including the European Convention on Human Rights21,
the Genocide Convention22, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights23 and the four Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols 24 (that protect the civilians and victims of war). By
including criminal provisions and obligations for nations these also gave strong notions of a
development in international criminal law.25
In spite of the existence of these conventions, and not to mention the globalisation of the world
which has lead nations to increase co-operation in combating all kinds of matters, including
money laundering, drug trafficking, terrorism, people smuggling, traffic in nuclear and
conventional weapons and materials, not to mention tax evasion, individual countries have very
                                                           
18 Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics and Values’, p. 3-4.
19 Malekian, Farhad, ‘International Criminal Law –The Legal and Critical Analysis of International Crimes’, 1991,
p. 1 and 9, and Malekian, Farhad, ‘The Monopolization of International Criminal Law in the United Nations’, 1995,
p. 26.
20 Ibid Malekian, 1991, p. 2.
21 The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950).
22 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) (The Genocide Convention).
23 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); GA Resolution 217A (III)
24 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I and II of 1977. The Geneva Conventions as
drafted in 1949 evolved from 19th century protocols (1864).
25 Davis, Patricia H., ‘The Politics of Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime’, 2000, and Supernor, Major Christopher M.,
‘International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice’, 2001.
rarely acted on their international obligations to assist each other in punishing grave crimes
against humanity.26 A traditional limitation of international law is its lack of a criminal
jurisdiction and the institutions to consistently enforce it. There is a vastly bigger chance in this
world of getting prosecuted and punished for murdering one person than for murdering a couple
of hundred thousand.
The Cold War era led the world community into a standstill and produced a climate that froze
foreign interference in domestic affairs. Sovereignty became the crowning and ultimate principle
of international law and states were very reluctant to become involved in neighbouring countries’
domestic affairs. The climate did not foster international criminal law, on the contrary, there was
an absence of community desire to end impunity. Over the last decade both international criminal
and humanitarian law have developed substantially compared to earlier years, due to, it seems,
growing support from the international community to put an end to the worst international crimes
by effective enforcement of the laws preventing them. The depth of this commitment is as yet
unknown. The development of international law is engaged in a constant struggle with state
sovereignty. Generally (and historically), criminal prosecution has been regarded as a domestic
consideration. States may seem willing to create an international criminal court, but are they
willing to place the necessary restrictions on their sovereignty in order for it to be independent
and effective?
2.2. Law vs. Politics
Even though lawyers sometimes have a tendency to separate them, one must realise that it is very
hazardous to distinguish law from politics. Our legislatures are political actors creating law under
political influences and for political ends. This is not to depreciate the role of law or the
awareness of the fact that law-making is also subject to law, but to get an understanding of law –
and of International Law in particular – it is important to keep the political influences and
limitations on law firmly in mind.27
                                                           
26 White, ‘Nowhere to run, Nowhere to hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, the ICC, and a Wake-up Call
for Former Heads of State’.
27 Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics and Values’, p. 8.
Since international law and the creation of it is influenced by the political forces in the world, it is
obvious that dominant states will have a huge impact on the international legal system (as they
have on international politics). One can often explain sources of international law by studying the
political environment and the system of states that it emerged from. The environment for law-
making was hampered for a long time as a direct consequence of the cold war’s bipolar political
system but since then the prospects for interstate unanimity and regulation have widely improved.
Also state compliance with existing international law (as well as the general health of
international order) is determined by the international system of states and political forces and
thus changes from time to time.
This is indeed significant for the evolution of the International Criminal Court, looking at the
realities in which it is slowly taking form. Even if it is easy to support the establishment of an
international criminal court for prosecutions of grave international crimes in theory, the political
reality is another and the ICC’s practical success is far from assured.
3. INTERNATIONAL COURTS
3.1. The Predecessors and Their Legacy
There is no permanent international court except for the International Court of Justice, to which
jurisdiction states consent ad hoc or have consented to in advance. The International Court of
Justice resolves disputes between states as an arbitrate body but has no criminal or individual
judicial determination.28 Up until the present the international community has been very reluctant
to enforce international criminal law. It has only been done a couple of times in history, without
doubt due to the very specific circumstances and the political climate at the time. The idea of
establishing a permanent international criminal court is not new though. Attempts in that
direction were taken as early as the end of World War I29, but the international community never
reached agreement on the matter.
The ICC’s predecessors are primarily the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals created by the
victorious Allies after World War II. These tribunals have been accused of being unfair and
                                                           
28 The Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), Articles 34 and 36.
merely institutions for “victor’s justice”, but nevertheless they did lay the groundwork for modern
international criminal law. They were the first tribunals where violators of international law were
held responsible for their crimes. They also recognised individual accountability and rejected
historically used defences based on state sovereignty.30 These principles of international law
recognised in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgements were later affirmed in a resolution by the
UN General Assembly.31
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were founded on the wish that atrocities similar to those that
had taken place during the Second World War would “never again” recur. In 1948 the UN
General Assembly adopted a resolution reciting that “[i]n the course of development of the
international community, there will be an increasing need of an international judicial organ for
the trial of certain crimes under international law.”32 Initiatives to create such an institution were
taken as early as 1937 by the League of Nations that formulated a convention for the
establishment of an international criminal court, but the cold war led to deadlock in the
international community and the matter fell into oblivion.33 For fifty years the global community
shut its eyes to international lawlessness and let the worst perpetrators go free.34 Sadly we realise
that the cruelties during World War II were not isolated incidents. Genocide has since Nuremberg
taken place in Uganda, in Cambodia, in Rwanda, in Somalia, in Bosnia, and the list could go on.
Not until the world were shocked by the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the
genocide in Rwanda could the UN, no longer paralysed by the cold war, take action. In response
the Security Council, basing its decision on chapter VII of the UN Charter, commissioned two ad
hoc international criminal tribunals (the ICTY for the former Yugoslavia and the ICTR for
Rwanda) to investigate alleged violations and to bring the perpetrators to justice.35 These were the
                                                                                                                                                                                               
29 It is expressed in the Treaty of Versailles Articles 227-230.
30 Ward, Alex, ‘Breaking the Sovereignty Barrier: The United States and the International Criminal Court’, 2001.
31 King and Theofrastous, ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy’.
32 United Nations Doc. A/760, Dec. 5, 1948.
33 Wallace, Rebecca M.M., ‘International Law’, 1997, p. 218-219, and Wergeni, ‘Får vi en ny internationell
brottmålsdomstol?’, p. 1.
34 Matas, David, ‘International Conference: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years Later’, 2000,
p. 4.
35 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (the ICTY) was established by UN Security
Council Resolution 827 on May 23, 1993. The International Tribunal for the Prosecutions of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory Rwanda and
first international ‘courts’ created after the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the first judicial
organs ever to be established by the SC.36 They were granted limited geographical (over
Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively) and subject jurisdiction37 38, but were made superior to the
national courts of Yugoslavia and Rwanda.39 Without doubt, these courts have significantly
contributed to the development of international criminal law, but they have not been entirely
successful. Their biggest problems have been the lack of formal means of enforcement to seize
indicted criminals. The departing president of the ICTY criticised the UN SC for “doing too little
to help bring indicted people to justice”.40
Of course the role of the SC in creating ad hoc tribunals is controversial considering the veto-
powers of the victorious Allies from the Second World War. Countries that do not have
permanent seats in the SC and are not allies with those who have are wary of the SC’s ability to
protect themselves from similar adjudication and investigation. The prospect of ever establishing
an ICT covering the Chechnya or Iraq conflicts for example is minimal. This creates
consequences for other countries’ perception of the legitimacy of the ICTY and ICTR. In this
case especially the perceptions of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Except for the institutions mentioned, the European Court of Human Rights created by the
Council of Europe, has compulsory jurisdiction over state parties that violate the European
Convention of Human Rights. But it has no criminal jurisdiction; its judgement merely indicates
that a violation has been committed and does not include remedy or enforcement of a certain
decision, though it may award compensation and costs. Additionally it works only in Europe
where in comparison with other parts of the world, the support for criminal law enforcement and
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring
States, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, (the ICTR), was established by UN Security Council
Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994. See Lagrådsremissen, p. 23-24.
36 Danner, Allison Marston, ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing’, 2001.
37 The subject jurisdiction covered violations against the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, crimes
against humanity and genocide, and in Yugoslavia also violations of the law or customs of war.
38 Supernor, ‘International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement Justice’.
39 Ward, ‘Breaking the Sovereign Barrier: the United States and the International Criminal Court’.
40 Supernor, ‘International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement Justice’.
basic human rights has been strong.41 A similar Inter-American human rights court is active and
has had modest success.42
3.2. The Birth of an International Criminal Court
After the cold war tensions had dissolved the world community showed a renewed interest in
creating an international criminal court. On December 4, 1989, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted a resolution that instructed the International Law Commission (the ILC) to
study the feasibility of the creation of a permanent ICC.43 Four years later, and obviously pleased
with the ILC’s report, the General Assembly called on the Commission to commence the process
of drafting a statute for the court. This statute was presented in 1994. The following year a
preparatory committee was established to further review the substantive issues regarding the
creation of a court based on the ILC report and statute. The aim was to prepare a convention for
the ICC that had the prospects of being widely accepted globally. The committee worked on a
draft for three years that was presented in 1998 and delivered the same year to the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries, which started the negotiations in Rome on June 15 (and ended with the signing
of the ICC Treaty July 17).44
Of course there are also other reasons explaining why we are now keen to create a world court
even though those ideas have failed so many times in history. We are witnessing a rising
confidence in domestic courts that is mirrored also in the interstate system. Henkin writes: “We
live in the age of judges: spreading commitment to “constitutionalism” has included commitment
to the rule of law and an independent judiciary is increasingly seen as essential to the rule of law;
impartial adjudication is increasingly seen as at the heart of legal remedy.”45
                                                           
41 Charney, Jonathan I., ‘Progress in International Criminal Law?’, 1999, and Morris, Madeline, The United States
and the International Criminal Court: High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-party States’, 2000.
42 Ibid Charney.
43 It was Trinidad & Tobago’s desire to see drug traffickers effectively tried that motivated their statement to the
General Assembly in 1989.
44 King and Theofrastous, ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy’, and Barrett,
Matthew A., ‘Ratify or Reject: Examining the United States’ Opposition to the International Criminal Court’, 1999.
See also Lagrådsremissen, p. 23.
4. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
4.1. State Autonomy and How it Affects the Two Components of International Law
One of the principles of International Law: “the principle of unanimity”, means that a state is only
bound by law that it agrees to in advance. State consent makes sure that state autonomy is
protected. International law consists of two components, custom and treaty.46 Treaty law includes
all inter-state binding agreements, like the ICC-treaty, and is made in comparison to customary
law that results from general and consistent state practice out of opinio juris, which means that
the states act out of a sense of legal obligation.47 The principle of unanimity means that no state
can be bound by a treaty it has not consented to or can be forced to join a treaty but also that no
state can veto legislation through multilateral treaty between other states.48
But even if no state can hinder others from joining a treaty this does not mean that the absence of
significant states will not cause problems. For a multilateral treaty to become general law, it has
to gain world-wide support and co-operation, which means that abstention of a particular state
like the USA easily can undermine an otherwise widely recognised treaty, by refusing to act in
accordance with it (in the case of the ICC Treaty withholding information, refuse to extradite
Americans, etc). Accordingly, as long as a treaty is met with determined resistance from
important states (important meaning that they are in a position where they have control over the
subject-matter of the treaty), law cannot be made. Any attempt to, will likely result in ineffective
treaties that have little chance of ever reaching the provisions necessary for general customary
international law. Universal rules need to be based on the principle of reciprocity why US non-
approval would lead to an unaccepted asymmetry.
4.2. Jus Cogens
International law recognises the principle of jus cogens, which means that there is a couple of
norms that have the character of peremptory form or supreme law and thus cannot be modified or
derogated from by  treaty or custom. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties refers to jus
cogens but it is not clear which norms fall within the concept. Article 2 (4) of the United Nations
                                                                                                                                                                                               
45 Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics and Values’, p. 54-55
46 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is generally said to list the sources of international
law, though it does not say so explicitly. It directs how the court is to decide disputes that it has to settle.
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Charter has been accepted as jus cogens and the same goes for rules prohibiting genocide, slave
trade and slavery, apartheid, use of force and other gross violations of human rights49; basically
the crimes within the ICC jurisdiction are regarded as jus cogens.
4.3. Individuals as Subjects of International Criminal Law
Until after World War I states were the only ones that had rights and duties due to international
criminal law, but at the end of World War II this changed. The Nuremberg Tribunal exercised
jurisdiction over individuals, pronouncing that the fact that “international law imposes duties and
liabilities upon individuals as well as states has long been recognised. […] Crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”.50 Since
Nuremberg the principle of individual criminal responsibility has been expressed and affirmed in
the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing the laws of war and its
1977 protocols, and the 1973 Convention on Apartheid51. The conventions went a step further
towards criminalising such activity by obliging ratifying states to implement the provisions in
national law. Not withstanding the fact that individuals can never have the capacity to conclude
treaties, only states, individuals are now seen as subjects of international criminal law.52
4.4. Jurisdiction Based on Territory and Nationality
Historically, the jurisdiction of criminal violations is based on the principle of territoriality, which
originates from the equality and sovereignty of states within the international system of law.
Malekian express that “every state owns and exercises exclusive territorial jurisdiction upon its
subjects and aliens”.53 In comparison, the principle of nationality is based upon the conception
that the nationals of a state are an important part of state sovereignty. Thus the country of
nationality can exercise jurisdiction and has the right to punish a violator of international crimes.
When the two principles coincide, the most common example would be when a national commits
a crime abroad and then returns to his home state, the question of jurisdiction and which principle
should prevail, may arise. Most European states’ law, as well as most treaties, acknowledge the
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principle of nationality to be complementary to the principle of territoriality. Accordingly, the
fact that the state of nationality claims jurisdiction over its nationals does not preclude the right of
the state in which the offence took place to exercise jurisdiction based on the territorial
principle.54
4.5. Universal Jurisdiction
International treaties governing international crimes have been given limited jurisdictions based
on territorial and national jurisdiction, but some offences have been made “crimes of universal
concern”. Henkin writes: “as to which the desire to assure punishment or deterrence was deemed
to outweigh the sensitivities of the territorial state or the concerns of the state of nationality of the
person charged; hence the move to render certain offences – genocide, war-crimes, and later,
apartheid – to be violations of customary law, of obligations erga omnes, and subject to universal
jurisdiction”.55 Erga omnes obligations are of such weight and importance for the world
community that they are the concern of all states.56
The term ‘Universal’ means that international criminal law imposes compulsory obligations upon
the nation-states that prohibit them from certain activities and that have to be followed no matter
what.57 The principle of ‘Universality’ entails a right in every nation to punish certain acts that
are so grave that they are considered crimes against the whole international community,
notwithstanding that the crime occurred outside the prosecuting nation’s territory and neither the
perpetrator nor victim were nationals of it. The crimes that fall under this rule are historically
piracy and slave trade, but also war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity have
been widely accepted as having universal jurisdiction. The principle of ‘Universality’ thus means
that every state can seize and prosecute perpetrators of these crimes under its domestic criminal
laws.58
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4.6. Extradition and Immunity
If a country is seeking to exercise jurisdiction over an alleged perpetrator present in a territory of
another state, it can request that he should be handed over through extradition. Even though it has
sometimes been said so, it is now generally agreed that no legal obligation exists in customary
law to extradite a person requested by another state. Nevertheless states have commonly agreed to
extradite on a reciprocal basis.59 Extradition is regulated by bipartite treaties that impose mutual
obligations on both states. Without the treaty, there is no legal duty to extradite.60 Extradition is a
sensitive matter, since the criminal normally has a connection or even a political relationship with
the country on which territory he “hides”. Examples are the Shah of Iran and Ferdinand Marcos
from the Philippines, who the USA refused to extradite on request, even though both of them had
been condemned for alleged crimes against their own populations in violations of the 1948
Genocide Convention.61
Another example is Pinochet. In October 1998, Spain surprised the international community by
requesting the arrest and extradition of the former Chilean head of state, Pinochet, from Britain
where he was recovering from a back surgery. Spain sought extradition based on universal
jurisdiction for prosecution of alleged human rights violations that had taken place in Chile under
Pinochet’s infliction, but he resisted by claiming diplomatic immunity and immunity as a former
head of state. These claims were denied by the House of Lords that wrote: “International law has
made plain that certain types of conduct (…) are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone.
This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as it does to everyone else; the contrary
conclusion would make a mockery of international law”62.63 Of course international law cannot
grant immunity for perpetrators of crimes the same international law condemns as universally
wrong and prosecutable.
Pinochet was later determined mentally unfit to stand trial, but by denying him immunity, the
House of Lords reduced the scope for immunity to undermine the objectives of international
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criminal law. The House of Lord’s decision can be understood as saying that Pinochet would
have been extradited if it was not for his bad health and age.64
5. STATE PRACTICE AS OF TODAY
Despite a large number of international criminal conventions, the global adherence has been low.
State practice for prosecution of international crimes against humanity is practically non existent.
As presented, states can prosecute individuals for breaches of international humanitarian law
through their domestic criminal courts according to the jurisdiction they have been granted
through treaty obligations, for example the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions65
and the Genocide Convention (1948). (These treaties today even bind non-party states since they
have matured into customary international law.)66
5.1. The Geneva Conventions and Protocols
The Geneva Conventions and Protocols, that protect the civilians and victims of war against war
crimes, require states to:
(i) enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
committing, or ordering to be committed, (…) grave breaches [of the Convention]
(ii) search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed such
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts. It may also (…) hand such persons over for trial to another (…) contracting
party concerned, provided [it] has made out a prima facie case67
Even though the treaty clearly outline the responsibility for states to search for, detain and try
domestically or extradite those accused of war crimes, impunity has so far prevailed and it is
certainly an ominous precedent for the ICC if it ever begins operations. The Geneva Conventions
had never been enacted until the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR.68
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5.2. The Genocide Convention
Similarly to the Geneva Conventions, the 1948 Genocide Convention obligates the treaty-parties
to prevent and punish genocide, even though it does not explicitly deal with questions of search
and arrest. The Convention declares that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time
of war, is a crime under international law for which individuals can be tried and for which, as
under the Geneva Conventions, states have a duty to prosecute. Additionally, the Genocide
Convention specifically calls for the creation of an international criminal court.69
Even though the Genocide Convention has been in force since 1948, a violator wasn’t convicted
for the crime of genocide until fifty years later, notwithstanding that millions of people have been
killed in genocide in the meantime and despite overwhelming evidence against for example the
Nazis during the Nuremberg Tribunals. The first verdict was pronounced against Jean-Paul
Akayesu by the ICTR in 1998.70 Still, no sitting head of state has ever been punished or even
criminally prosecuted by another state for genocide, torture or other crimes against humanity.71
The problem has not been that states haven’t been able to prosecute and punish individuals during
this time, but that they haven’t been forced to. State sovereignty has been emphasised over
individual criminal responsibility. Sovereignty implies a nationalistic attitude, built on the idea
that one must deal only with situations which may affect one’s own territory or one’s own
nationals. Malekian writes that the “overriding influence of power politics on the system of
international legal order can be regarded as one of the essential reasons for the non-applicability
of the system of international criminal law to certain states”.72
Examining the conventions above it is clear that both a right and an obligation to exercise
universal jurisdiction over individuals have existed in international law for decades. The crimes
that will be prosecuted according to the Rome Statute are largely reflected in already existing
international law and states have already an obligation to bring perpetrators to justice. But the
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obligation has been dependent on states’ willingness to comply and there have been no
supranational enforcement mechanisms.
6. WHY DO WE NEED AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
6.1. The Importance of Enforcement
The principle of state-autonomy in International law means that states have to give their consent
to submit to the authority of treaty and customary law. They express a voluntary will to comply
with the law and consequently they have to observe it from that day on. The question that arises is
what happens when they don’t? International law as we know it today lacks enforcement-
measures like an international police force and courts. This basically means that even if a state
has consented to be bound by the law, nothing but political pressure can influence compliance.
There are no legal remedies. So far states have been very reluctant to submit them selves or their
nationals to any sort of monitoring or enforcement of its observance by international institutions.
Since no international courts with power to inflict remedies for violations of international
criminal law have existed, the punishment of violators have been left to domestic criminal courts
and their regulations. Consequently, prosecution and punishment of international crimes has
varied from one domestic system to another.
To have an effective system of law there should be an effective and independent institution that
ensures its compliance. International criminal law has several weaknesses that handicap its
enforceability, though it is arguable that it is not weaknesses but rather the inhibit character of
international law. Since the enforcement so far takes place at the domestic level, one can also say
that it is there that the principal weaknesses of international criminal law appear. There has been a
high degree of political influence in the system of international criminal law by powerful states. It
is perfectly clear that without an international criminal court to enforce observance of
international criminal law, the system stands and falls on state co-operation and good will. So far
states have been entrusted to act in accordance with treaty obligations without any authoritative
control to ensure compliance. This has left states free to neglect and disregard international
liabilities when and if they deem it necessary. It also provides the opportunity for states to
misunderstand or misinterpret their international obligations as well as refusing to recognise its
own actions as criminal. The problem has been most noticeable when the alleged violator has
been a national or even the head of state or senior official in the state where he or she can be
prosecuted. The feasibility of states to recognise activities of their own individuals, not to
mention authorised individuals, to violate international criminal law has been little.73 Of course
there is an unwillingness to prosecute one’s own personnel. Domestic courts cannot be trusted to
impartially prosecute their own nationals for crimes they have committed abroad. The most
evident example is the prosecutions after the First World War before the Supreme Court of
Germany at Leipzig. The Allies sent a list of 896 suspected German war criminals to Germany,
which led to no more than twelve prosecutions and six convictions with initial sentences from six
month to four years in prison.74
Other states have generally abstained from meddling when violations have taken place on foreign
territory, even if they have been obligated or at least given a right through treaties to claim
universal jurisdiction to prosecute. This reluctance stems from the principal of sovereignty. Since
the crimes in question are often highly political, exercising universal jurisdiction would not only
mean prosecuting criminals but probably exposing a whole country and its governance to an
overview. This would of course complicate important political and economic relations, not to
mention the fact that the country applying universal jurisdiction must be prepared to be subject to
the same exposure itself. Authority to exercise universal jurisdiction has been uncertain for
centuries, because of the global reluctance to use it in practice. The practical implementation of
international criminal law is often behind the theoretical prerequisites. Lately, the concept of
universal jurisdiction has received more attention and its meaning has become clearer.75
Without mandatory enforcement, one can venture to say that the influence of politically or
military strong states on criminal conventions and observance, is fundamental. When a state,
specifically a powerful state, is reluctant to fulfil its international criminal obligations, what is
there to do? The creation of a permanent international criminal court is essential to the
observance of international criminal law. We need a legal system of enforceability to ensure
(equal) compliance with international criminal law, instead of the existing political pressure.
                                                           
73 Charney, ‘Progress in International Criminal Law?’.
74 Penrose, ‘Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law’.
75 The U.S. extradition of John Demjanjuk to Israel was based on universal jurisdiction, see Charney, ‘Progress in
International Criminal Law?’, and Spain requested extradition of Pinochet from Great Britain based on universal
jurisdiction, see Supernor, ‘International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of Jusitce’.
However, the institution will only be effective if states respect its jurisdiction. The fact is that the
system of international criminal law does not function in the absence of support from politically
strong states.
6.2. The Need for Uniformity and Consistency
The ICC would bring perpetrators of international core crimes to justice, who would otherwise
not be prosecuted by unwilling or in other ways politically deadlocked national courts. The Court
would complement national criminal judicial systems when they fail.76 It would bring
international crimes and their perpetrators out in the open and bring retribution, justice and
protection to their victims.
Without doubt, a permanent international court would make a more cost-effective solution, than a
continuing creation of ad hoc tribunals for future prosecutions of international crimes, not least
considering facilities, staff, administration and logistics.77 In comparison the ICC as a permanent
institution has a much bigger chance of achieving a level of expertise, efficiency, authority and
respect.78 It would also ensure legal security through uniformity and consistency in conviction
and sentences79 as well as develop an important case law of jurisprudence and bring international
law up to date. Of course a permanent institution would achieve a stronger deterrent effect than
the possibility of a costly establishment of an ad hoc tribunal.80 Certainty and predictability are
important factors for a strong deterrent-effect. The mere creation of an ICC assures individuals
they will be held accountable for their international violations and compared to an ad hoc
tribunal, it would be directly available for investigations and prosecutions after a crime has been
alleged.
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7. WHY A LEGITIMATE COURT IS VITAL
7.1. A Feedback Loop
Institutions of international law need legitimacy to encourage states to co-operate. One
component of legitimacy is the effectiveness of the institution. The connection can be illustrated
with a “feedback loop”: effectiveness encourages legitimacy, which by encouraging state co-
operation increases effectiveness. The question is how to achieve the necessary state support. As
has been envisaged on numerous occasions in history the problem of enforcement mechanisms in
international law will likely make itself reminded also in this case. International institutions lack
the level of enforcement that national institutions are equipped with. As shown, there is no
international police force and the UN has only weak, politically vulnerable sanctioning ability81,
characterised by the veto-power of the permanent SC members.82 The key determinant factor of
the ICC’s success in the absence of centralised enforcement of norms, will be the voluntary will
of states to comply with ICC requests and to act in furtherance of the aims of the ICC.83 The
strength of international censure, embarrassment on the part of the non-complying states as well
as pressure and criticism from non-governmental institutions will also play a role. So even if the
ICC is intended to work independently above its creators the nation-states, it will be bound by
their will to comply. This willingness will stem from a sense of obligation towards the ICC that
will derive from the legitimacy of the institution.
7.2. Legitimacy
The legitimacy of an international institution is built upon the perception of it by its subjects and
creators, in this case the nation-states. The perception and thus the institution’s legitimacy is
dependent on two elements:
1. belief in and commitment to the normative aims of the institution, and
2. the effectiveness of the institution in achieving these aims.84
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Green expresses it in this phrase: “Legitimacy commands obligation. Obligation is derived from
an idea that the sovereign [or institution] embodies the general will of the community and
upholds a system of rights that is recognized by its members.”85 Before considering whether the
international community is generally committed to the aims of the ICC, these should be stated.
7.2.1. The Objectives of the Court
In brief, the International Criminal Court will exercise jurisdiction on a permanent basis
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction over individuals alleged to be perpetrators of the
most serious crimes of international concern, specifically defined in the Rome Statute. The ICC is
to undertake unbiased investigation and if necessary bring the accused to trial by an impartial
panel according to impartial law and due process in accordance with international legal norms.86
7.2.2. Belief in and Commitment to the Institution’s Normative Aims
The Rome Treaty was negotiated in Rome during five weeks and in the presence of 160 states, 33
intergovernmental organisations and 236 non-governmental organisations.87 The negotiations
were characterised by a mosaic of positions and wills that divided countries into different
groupings, quite dissimilar to the normal political and regional ones. Of course the result from
Rome is what can be expected from a conference where the world community tries to create an
international institution: a global compromise. It is not my purpose to second-guess the states’
commitment in the ICC’s normative aims, but 120 individual signing parties88 to the treaty at
least indulges expectations of widespread international support. Because even if various states
wished for various inclusions or exclusions during the negotiations89, their “for” vote obviously
stands for a general agreement with and belief in the normative aims of the Court. Consequently,
and assuming that nothing will change the international community’s commitment (42 states have
ratified the Statute so far90), the ICC’s legitimacy stands and falls on the second factor, its
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effectiveness in fulfilling its aims. This in turn is dependent on how well the Rome Statute
positions the ICC in achieving the aims it has been created for. Thus, we need to examine the
Statute and the willingness of states to provide the ICC with the necessary strength, power,
founds and independence to become an effective international institution that delivers impartial
justice. The ICC will in any case be dependent on the international community’s willingness to
support it. The refusal of China and the USA to adopt the Statute illustrates this very problem
well.
7.2.3. The Effectiveness of the Court
Sceptics would say that adjudication without institutions of enforcement is not impressive and
unlikely to be effective. The rule of law, when defined in the abstract, is said to require certainty
and consistency of enforcement as one of the elements of its existence.91 The United Nations
Security Council is sometimes referred to as the international police force but that is neither its
purpose nor operation.92 Without effective enforcement mechanisms to bring indicted criminals
to the Court, the ICC is in a position when it has to rely on state support even before it can prove
itself efficient. Supernor writes: “Increasing the number of available forums to prosecute (…)
criminals will not serve the interests of justice if the international community lacks the ability to
locate and arrest indicted (…) criminals” and proscribes the establishment of an international
police or authorised international bounty hunters to help the ICC reach its aims.93 Unfortunately
the precedent from the ad hoc tribunals is not positive in this regard. They have had remarkable
problems due to the lack of formal means of enforcement to cease indicted criminals. They have
not been able to rely on state co-operation94 even though they have had the consent of UN
member states to act in accordance with SC actions in its favour.
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8. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
8.1. The Conference in Rome
As mentioned, the participating states at the Rome Conference numbered 160, and they were
joined by a couple of hundred different organisations. At the end of the negotiations, 120 states
voted for the adoption of the ICC Statute95, while 21 abstained and 7 voted against. As of now,
139 states have signed the treaty and 42 have ratified it. Since it is a multilateral agreement,
countries will be bound to it once they ratify it (compared to for example the ICTY and ICTR that
through their creation by the UN SC, bind all members of the UN).
The convention involved many areas of international criminal and humanitarian law, criminal
procedure and extradition that touched sensitive domestic sovereignty and political issues. Four
different brands of arguments could be distinguished during the negotiations: (1) a voluntarist
position that demanded that consent should be required for jurisdiction, which is closely related to
(2) the realist position that is typically stated by the USA and its allies who believe in the
supremacy of the sovereign state, opposes a powerful, independent court and instead wants the
Court to be closely connected to and monitored by the UN SC; (3) a universalist attitude that
denotes a court with inherent jurisdiction over all or some crimes, and (4) the legalist argument
that argues for a strong and effective court, believing that law is more important than national
sovereignty.96
The Rome Statute as drafted at the conference by the states present, is the foundation from which
the ICC emerges. The multilateral treaty provides it with the unique power to prosecute and
sentence individuals that violate the gravest international crimes. The Statute is structured by a
preamble and thirteen parts which include 128 articles.97 I will, in the following, analyse these
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closer, with a focus on the provisions I regard as the core of the Statute.98 These parts are: (1) the
concept of complementarity; (2) the subject matter jurisdiction; (3) the geographical jurisdiction
(4) the mechanisms for triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction; (5) admissibility and (6) enforcement of
state co-operation. I will start off by presenting the three underlying principles that the ICC is
based on. In connection with my analysis of the ICC Statute I will address and examine some of
the relevant US objectional arguments and concerns.
8.2. Three Underlying Principles
8.2.1. Complementarity
With the emphasis on sovereignty the US strongly advocated basing the ICC on the concept of
complementarity, which the drafters also did (Article 1).99 This means that crimes fall within the
Court’s jurisdiction only when the domestic judiciary of competent primacy jurisdiction is unable
or unwilling to prosecute.100 This is in contradiction to the ICTY and the ICTR, which are
superior to national courts, while the ICC is merely complementary and consequently has the
character of a last resort.101 The ICC will only be enacted when domestic courts are unable to
secure the international legal system. “Complementarity” is thus rather a generous way of
describing it: “subsidiarity” would be better.
8.2.2. International Core Crimes
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.102 This principle was meant to encourage broad acceptance of the Court
and also avoid overloading the Court and thus stretching the resource demands on member states.
This gave the court a better chance of attaining effectiveness and credibility.103
8.2.3. Customary International Law
The crimes that will be prosecuted according to the Rome Statute are largely reflected in existing
international law. Even if some voices have been raised in contradiction, the crimes in the Rome
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agreement are not founded on new definitions. As will be shown below, the Statute is a
reinforcement of the human rights violations of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and the crime of aggression in force since years back.104 105 A majority of the world community
additionally considered these crimes to be norms of jus cogens.106 The wish in Rome was not to
create new criminal law but, through restatement of crimes prohibited in international treaties and
customary law, clarify the obligations under ICC jurisdiction.107 Danilenko writes that the
majority of states participating in the Rome negotiations agreed that the criminal law of the Rome
Statute essentially restated the existing law. One should note, that the permanent members of the
SC had already acknowledged a substantive part of these as constituting customary international
law, when establishing the ICTY and ICTR. At the creation of the Yugoslav tribunal the
Secretary-General wrote in a report regarding the ICTY statute that with respect to the principle
nullum crimen sine lege, the tribunal “should apply rules of international humanitarian law which
are beyond any doubt part of customary law”. The SC accepted the report and established the
ICTY based on the referred statute and thereby recognised that it was merely restating existing
criminal law.108
8.3. General Provisions
8.3.1. Funding
The ICC budget is to be determined by the state parties (through the Assembly of States
Parties109)110 and will be financed by these. Additionally, contributions can be received from UN
funds and from voluntary governments, international organisations and individuals, according to
certain prescribed criteria.111
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The ICC will not be cheap; it is likely to cost as much as a hundred million dollars annually.112
Funding is always a problem for international institutions, as the UN has found out on more than
one occasion. Accordingly, one can imagine a situation where unsatisfied states withhold their
dues in order to force national objectives on the ICC. Here the issue of legitimacy will again be
crucial. As long as the Court is regarded as legitimate the possibility of refusals to pay will be
reduced.
8.3.2. Judicial Competence
According to Article 34 the Court shall be composed by the following organs: (a) the Presidency;
(b) an Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division; (c) the Office of the
Prosecutor and (d) the Registry.
The Court will have 18 judges. With respect to the eligibility of these, the Rome Statute follows
in the form of the ICJ founding statute, which has generally been commended. The ICJ has been
regarded as institutionally and adjudicatively independent.113 The Judges eligibility is determined
by the qualifications that would be required in their respective states for appointment to the
highest judicial offices.114 They will be nominated as well as elected by the Assembly of State
Parties in accordance with Article 36. The judges shall be independent when performing their
duties and are prohibited from engaging in any activity that could interfere with or affect this
independence or impartiality.115 No two judges can be nationals of the same state.116
The office of the prosecutor shall be headed by the prosecutor and act independently as a separate
organ of the Court. The prosecutor is responsible for receiving referrals and information about
alleged crimes within the ICC jurisdiction, for examining them and conducting investigations and
prosecutions.117 He or she will be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members
of the Assembly of state parties. The independence and impartiality of the prosecutor as well as
the grounds for disqualification is considered in detail and is similar to that of the judges.118 Both
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the prosecutor and judges will be elected for a term of nine years and are not eligible for re-
election.119
8.3.3. Constitutional Issues
The US has claimed that a major reason for not being able to accept the ICC statute is that it is
“unconstitutional”, meaning that American nationals accused of crimes before the Court are not
guaranteed their rights under the United States Constitution. However, the Statute provides for
“minimum guarantees” very similar to the United States’ Bill of Rights, especially formulated to
alleviate US concerns. This means that the ICC would offer Americans more protection than
many national courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the accused.120 For example, the
Statute includes provisions stating that the trial must be in the presence of the accused (Article
63); double jeopardy is prohibited (Article 20); there is a presumption of innocence (Article 66);
the right to an attorney is guaranteed (Article 67:d) and the decision can be appealed by both the
defendant and the prosecutor (Articles 81-83).121 The principles of legality: nulla poena sine lege
and nullum crimen sine lege that means no conduct can be criminalised and/or punished without
prior legislation, can be found in Article 22 and 23 of the Rome Statute.
8.4. Jurisdiction of the Court
The jurisdiction of the ICC is based on four components: (1) ratione personae (personal
jurisdiction), (2) ratione materiae (subject matter jurisdiction), (3) ratione loci (geographic
jurisdiction); and (4) ratione temporae (time).122
8.4.1. Ratione Temporae
The Court’s jurisdiction is expressly limited to crimes committed after its establishment and entry
into force for each state.123
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8.4.2. Ratione Personae
The Statute provides for personal jurisdiction over individuals above the age of eighteen years
only.124 Natural persons are since the Nuremberg Tribunals regarded as the proper subjects of
international criminal law, which excludes entities such as organisations and states.
Article 27 provides accountability for all persons, including heads of state, that have committed a
crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction: “official capacity as a Head of State or Government (…) shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility”.125
Some concern has been raised in the matter of the ICC’s influence on interstate disputes. The fear
is expressed in arguments regarding the possibility that the indictment of an individual that has
violated ICC regulations pursuant to state policy or even authorised by a state government, will in
reality represent a judgement of his or her state’s actions and interfere in diplomatic relations.126
These concerns are misplaced. The ICC has not been created to consider or pass judgement on the
interstate roles or the ideological backdrop of a dispute, rather to avoid the notion of winner’s
justice. The ICC will not adjudicate the legality of states’ actions or settle any disputes between
them, but exclusively try individuals “on both sides” for international crimes.127 It is hardly the
fault of the ICC if this is interpreted as judgement of a state’s actions.
8.4.2.1. Superior Orders and Prescription of Law
The fact that a crime has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of
a superior, whether civilian or military, are not grounds for excluding responsibility unless the
person was under a legal obligation to obey the orders, the person did not know that the order was
unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful. Orders to commit genocide or crimes
against humanity are manifestly unlawful.128
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8.5. The ICC Crimes
The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with the Statute to the most serious crimes of global
international concern, namely: (a) The Crime of Genocide; (b) Crimes against Humanity; (c) War
Crimes and (d) The Crime of Aggression.129
8.5.1. Genocide
Genocide, meaning acts like killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a
group, committed with intent to destroy that national, ethnical, racial or religious group130 has
long been recognised as a crime of international criminal law. The definition of genocide in
Article 6 follows verbatim the definition in the Genocide Convention Article II, which is regarded
as constituting both international treaty and custom law.131 The same definition was used in both
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, and its meaning has been furthered detailed in the important ICTR
case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu, which lead to the first verdict based on genocide in history and
will no doubt serve as precedent for the ICC.132
8.5.2. Crimes against Humanity
Although crimes against humanity are recognised crimes under international law, there is no
generally accepted definition of such crimes in either treaty or customary law. When the crime
have been regulated earlier in the Tokyo, Nuremberg, ICTY and ICTR charters, the definitions
have been brief and differed from each other. The definition in Article 7 adopted in Rome
borrows from all of them, and is broader than its predecessors’. The most significant contrast to
both the Nuremberg and ad hoc tribunals is that the Rome Statute states that crimes against
humanity can take place in either wartime or peacetime.133
But the Rome Statute imposes high thresholds for crimes to be considered crimes against
humanity that stretch further than existing international standards.134 According to Article 7:1 the
crime must be part of a “widespread or systematic attack” directed against a “civilian
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population”, with “knowledge of the attack”.135 This means that not only must the prosecutor
show that the crime was committed by the defendant, but that he or she personally knew the
larger context of his or her actions.136 Additionally, the attack must entail “a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts (…) against any civilian population pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack” (Article 7:2 (a)).137 This
seems to require that the crime is based on a plan on behalf of a state or another sort of entity.
Crimes against humanity are for example: murder, extermination, enslavement, torture and the
crime of apartheid. The Rome Negotiations led to a couple of innovations that were added to the
Statute, for example under the heading of “rape”: “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity”.138
8.5.3. War Crimes
Article 8 of the Rome Statute more or less restates existing laws and customs regarding war
crimes found in the Geneva conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocol I and II and the Hague
convention. These treaties do not provide for criminal responsibility, but according to the ICTY
Appeals Chamber and the general development, criminalisation of the prohibitions against war
crimes are now acknowledged.139
Since only the gravest international crimes shall be prosecuted before the ICC, Article 8 states
that the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when they have been
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.140
This excludes random acts of over-broad personnel from ICC jurisdiction and was specifically
inserted in the statute to alleviate US concerns.141
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War crimes means for example: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment including biological
experiments and extensive unjustified destruction and appropriation of poverty. Article 8 of the
Rome Statute includes a couple of innovations. For example are various acts against UN and
humanitarian organisation personnel as well as enlisting children under the age of fifteen years
into national armed forces, included as crimes. A controversial innovation is the amendment of
the words “directly or indirectly” in Article 8(b) (viii), defining the crime of transfer by the
occupying power of its civilian population to an occupied territory.142 This has resulted in Israeli
objections since the new definition seems to label Israeli settlement activity as war crimes.
According to Israel the definition is “an example of either poor drafting or deliberate misuse of
the Court for political purposes”.143 But the definition is an already existing provision in
international law, except for the addition of the words “directly or indirectly”. Bare in mind that
the Court will hear only the most serious crimes of global concern and that an act to be regarded
as a war crime needs to be committed during an armed conflict, must be part of a plan or policy
or committed on a large scale.144
The exclusion of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from the list of war crimes is based
on a political compromise that greatly disappointed many.145 The US wanted the Statute to
prohibit chemical and biological weapons but wanted to keep nuclear weapons out of the ICC
jurisdiction at any cost, which ended with a trade-off and none was included.146
8.5.4. The Crime of Aggression
After World War II, a prohibition against aggressive war was included in the UN Charter, Article
2(4). Based on the SC’s finding of aggressiveness, the Council can order use of its Chapter VII
powers to end it.147 The crime of aggression was also embodied in the ICC’s jurisdiction, even
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though it has yet to be properly defined.148 Many states sought that the Court should not be able
to pursue a prosecution based on the crime of aggression unless the SC first makes a finding that
aggression exists. States not in control over the SC of course opposed tying the ICC to the power
of another institution, especially to the SC in its current form.149 One Author writes: “it is
incompatible with the concept of law that an entity subject to the law should have the final
authority to determine whether a legal rule applies to it”.150 151 As a compromise, the crime of
aggression was included in the Statute undefined. The final definition needs to be approved by a
7/8th majority, and until then the ICC shall not exercise that part of its subject-matter
jurisdiction.152
8.5.5. Opt-out of War Crimes
When a state ratifies the statute, it accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction over all crimes within the scope
of the statute. There is no right to opt-out of certain provisions, which the USA strongly
advocated (Scheffer refers to it as a “take it or leave it” text153), with one temporal exception.
States are allowed to opt out of ICC automatic jurisdiction over war crimes committed on its
territory or by its nationals for a period of seven years after the ICC has become operative for that
particular state (Article 124).154
8.6. Ratione Loci
ICC jurisdiction is primarily consensual and based on the traditional principles of territoriality
and nationality. According to Article 12, the ICC may exercise its geographical jurisdiction on
one of the following grounds: (a) if the state on which territory the crime occurred is a member to
the Statute; (b) if the person accused of committing the crime is a national of a member state to
the Statute or (c) if any of the states consent to ICC jurisdiction over the crime in question ad hoc.
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8.6.1. Are Non-party States Bound by the Treaty?
One of the fundamental principles of international treaty law is as mentioned before, that only
states that are party to a treaty can be imposed by its terms. It seems to be in contradiction to this,
that jurisdiction empowered by consent from the territorial state, means that even nationals from
non-party states can be subject to prosecution.
The US has objected against this; in the words of Ambassador Scheffer: “While we successfully
defeated initiatives to empower the court with universal jurisdiction, a form of jurisdiction over
non-party states was adopted by the conference despite our strenuous objections”.155 The USA
claims that jurisdiction over non-consenting non-party states must be incompatible with the law
of treaties and the principle of self-autonomy proscribing that a state has to give its consent to be
bound by a treaty.156 The general rule spelt out in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties states that treaties cannot create either obligations or rights for a nation that is not
a party to the treaty or has given its consent.157 The fact that the ICC can exercise jurisdiction
over nationals of non-party states does not equate with imposing obligations on them.158 In fact,
non-party states are not bound to or obligated through the treaty, and do not have to assist the
ICC in its work.159 What can happen is that nationals of non-party states can be tried for crimes
they commit on the territory of a party-state or a consenting state, if the crime is considered an
international core crime. There is nothing new in this. Surely the US cannot be objecting to the
well-established territorial jurisdiction of the state on which territory the crime has occurred. As
mentioned above,160 international core crimes are crimes of universal concern and subject to the
jurisdiction of any state in the world. The Rome Statute provides the State Parties with the same
jurisdictional rights that they already enjoy according to existing multilateral conventions.
Additionally there is nothing unusual about conferring jurisdiction over nationals of non-party
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states through the creation of a treaty, and the USA is not only a party to many such treaties, but
have also exercised jurisdiction over non-party nationals in the very way they are opposing.161
The issue remaining would be the correctness of letting an institution, established by the
international community, exercise the states’ delegated (a) universal jurisdiction; and, (b) extra-
territorial jurisdictional powers. One author questions the correctness of states delegating a matter
of customary international law like universal jurisdiction to an international court. She suggests
that it  ‘would constitute an innovation beyond the customary meaning of universal
jurisdiction’.162 On the contrary, the prevailing global opinion is that a theory of universal
international jurisdiction has developed from the precedent of Nuremberg and the two ad hoc
tribunals and further established through the creation of the ICC, according to which states
unanimously can delegate their individual universal jurisdiction to a representative organ. Sadat
and Carden write: “Since Nuremberg it has been accepted that, with respect to the establishment
of Courts for the trial of international crimes over which there exists universal jurisdiction, States
may do together what any one of them could have done separately”.163 This view is expressed in
UN documents commenting on the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal and also established
through the creation of the globally ratified Genocide Convention, that calls for the establishment
of a world court.164
Since any State on its own could prosecute perpetrators of the crimes contained in the ICC Statute
under universal regardless of his or her nationality and regardless where the crime took place, it is
difficult to fathom how a non-State party’s right under international law could be violated if states
through a treaty enabled an international court to prosecute the same crimes on their behalf.165
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8.7. Trigger Mechanisms
Cases can be triggered either by (1) the Security Council or by (2) individual countries
respectively the ICC prosecutor acting proprio motu, based on credible information of grave
atrocities (Article 13). The first track is based on Security Council action and will therefore
enforce compliance of orders for example evidence and extradition by all UN member states
according to their consent to co-operate with SC actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In
comparison track two has no built in mechanism of enforcement but must rely upon the state-
parties’ co-operation and good will.166
As seen above, the ICC was not granted jurisdiction based on universality, except for in situations
when cases are referred to the Court by the SC. When the SC refers a case, consent to
adjudication is not needed from any state and the ICC jurisdiction stretches as far as UN
membership, while if the matter is referred by a state or by the prosecutor proprio motu, the
jurisdiction is limited to the states that have ratified the ICC Statute, or consent to it ad hoc.167
This means that if the SC will not refer the case, ICC will never have jurisdiction over atrocities
committed on the territory of a third state by its own nationals.
While the USA sought iron-clad veto of jurisdiction for itself, it is amusing to take part of
Ambassador Scheffer’s concern for other non-party states avoiding the ICC: “The United States
has long supported the right of the Security Council to refer situations to the court with
mandatory effect, meaning that any rogue state could not deny the court’s jurisdiction under any
circumstances. We believe this is the only way, under international law and the U.N. Charter, to
impose the court’s jurisdiction on a non-party state”.168
Obviously the second track is much more limited than the first one, but because of its veto, the
US is not concerned about SC triggered cases. Instead, the Americans tried to stem the support
for an independent prosecutor and presented two major objectives against the proprio motu right.
Firstly the US expressed a fear that the prosecutor and judges of the Court would not be impartial
and secondly that in front of a politically motivated institution, cases would be brought against
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the USA for political reasons by malevolent states.169 It is of course a concern of the whole
international community for both political and legal reasons, that the prosecutor should not be
granted too much individual power. This is also appropriately attended to in the Rome-treaty
through extensive procedural safeguards designed to limit the Prosecutor in his or her line of
work, and there is no reason to doubt their sufficiency. Article 15 proscribes that the three-judge
Pre-Trial Chamber has to give the prosecutor authorisation before he or she can commence an
investigation proprio motu. After receiving information of a crime within the ICC jurisdiction,
the prosecutor shall examine the seriousness of this referral and conclude if there is a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation. In such case, the prosecutor must present the information
in front of the Pre-Trial Chamber, which will review the Prosecutor’s decision. If it finds
reasonable basis to exist, it shall authorise the commencement of an investigation.170
In contradiction to the US position I would say it is necessary to have a prosecutor proprio motu
that can initiate investigations when states and the SC fail to refer cases to the ICC for political
reasons.
8.7.1. The Role of the Security Council
In comparison to the ad hoc tribunals that were set up by the SC, the ICC was established on a
treaty basis and is thus independent of the UN. In spite of this there seems to be an unwarranted
degree of UN influence on the future adjudicator, advocated by some more eagerly than others.
The US for example, requested a very strong SC role in the operation of the ICC.
I think there are good reasons to keep the SC influence low. One of the most important notions of
the Rule of Law is equality before the law. We know that states are not equal in wealth, power
and influences but in legal conception they are equal in status, person-hood, legal capacity, rights
and duties. To assure legal equality among states and their nationals, we need to make sure that
the adjudicator is impartial and independent. A domestic court should be under the influence of
neither government nor parliament. Accordingly an international court should not be under the
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influence of, for example, the UN, especially not with the SC in its current form.171 The
International Criminal Court cannot be made subservient to the interests of powerful states, or its
legal character will be demolished.
The SC is prevented from taking any decision of significance against the will of the five
permanent members.172 The veto-power has left the SC, and as a consequence the UN, ineffective
and paralysed on many occasions when the political, military, economic and legal interests to act
have been lacking (even though the end of the Cold War has meant that the SC is not as
deadlocked as before).173 Malekian writes: “In all conceivable situations governing the
maintenance of international peace and security, it is solely the permanent members of the United
Nations who have the actual power to make judgements about breaches of peace and obviously
never successfully accuse themselves of violating the principles of international legal order”.174
The fact is the SC has adopted quite different approaches in different cases involving the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security and it is obvious that the SC is not
independent of political ties.
It would not be positive to tie the ICC’s operation to an institution which legitimacy is
questionable in its current form. Furthermore to establish an international criminal court where
states are given unequal influence would be the best way to ensure an illegitimate institution that
would lack confidence and hence would not be supported. The Court must have the power to
enforce law over all criminals, regardless of their political, legal and military strengths and
regardless of their position in the United Nations.175 It would go against the ICC’s purpose if only
nationals from the states not members or friends of the permanent five would be accountable for
their actions under international criminal law, and undoubtedly undermine the Court’s authority.
8.7.2. Still Some Security Council Control
The SC permanent members expressed concerns during the negotiations about the possible
conflict between ICC and SC respective functions. The permanent members of the SC were
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denied a right to individually veto cases within the ICC jurisdiction which they had suggested,
but were still collectively granted substantial control over the cases at the Court through Article
16: “No investigation of prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for
a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect”. This article allows the SC
to affirmatively vote for a postponement of an investigation or a case for up to a year and the
request can be renewed unlimited times by the Council under the same conditions.176
8.8. The Opt-out Right
Article 12 states that the signatory states accept the ICC jurisdiction on a continual, as opposed to
a case-by-case, basis.177 One of the US objections was the fact that the whole Rome-treaty had to
be consented to and that there didn’t exist a right to enter reservation from certain provisions of
the treaty.178 Obviously, there is no legal requirement in international law that this right should be
provided for.179 On the contrary one can understand the prohibition on reservations since that
would permit the parties to the statute to opt-out on parts of it, thus create a very complex
applicability of jurisdiction. The statute’s non-uniformity would if not totally paralyse the Court,
undoubtedly weaken the prospects of an effective and legitimate international criminal court. In
my view, the right to reservation from parts of the statute undermines the whole idea of vital
international criminal law; the crimes under the ICC Statute are already of universal character and
the idea was to create a permanent international (and I assume) effective court. Concession to the
US position would have presented the very criminals the ICC is designed to prosecute with an
immunity clause.
8.9. Complementarity and Admissibility
The Court’s complementary jurisdiction is evidenced by the provisions in Article 17, where
various cases are found inadmissible when:
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(a) The Case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless
the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The
case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not
to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability
of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person has already been tried for conduct which is the
subject of the complaint (Article 20:3); or (d) The case is of insufficient gravity to proceed with
the investigation (Article 15).
In order for the ICC to decide if a country is unwilling to prosecute an alleged perpetrator, the
statute provides guidelines on what shall be regarded as unwillingness. The Court shall consider
if the proceedings were or are actually being undertaken or if “the national decision was made for
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility”, if there are any
unjustified delays in the proceedings and if the proceedings are not being conducted “independent
or impartially”.180 Inability to prosecute can be determined when for example, the entire judicial
system of the prosecuting state has collapsed or if the state is unable to obtain the accused or
necessary evidence and testimonies.181
The admissibility of a case may be challenged by an accused; by a state that has jurisdiction over
a case on the grounds that it is investigating or prosecuting the matter or has investigated or
prosecuted; or by the state on whose territory the crime was committed or the state of nationality
of the accused, whose consent to the Court’s jurisdiction is required.182
8.9.1. Notification and Its Consequences
At the insistence of the USA, yet another protective mechanism was added in Article 18. This
provision proscribes that the prosecutor when about to commence an investigation, in addition to
being forced to request an authorisation in the matter from the Pre-Trial Chamber, also has to
notify states (including non-parties) that may have jurisdiction over the matter. Before the
prosecutor is allowed to start investigating he or she has to wait one month to see if the notified
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state wants to initiate its own examination of the matter under its domestic jurisdiction. If this
turns out to be the case, the prosecutor must defer his or her investigation, unless he or she can
show the Pre-Trial Chamber that the state’s wish to investigate is nothing but a sham.183 The Pre-
Trial Chamber’s decision is subject to appeal before the Appeals Chamber. As long as the state
pursues its investigation in a genuine manner, there is nothing preventing it from initiating it for
the sole purpose of hindering the case from proceeding before the Court. The state does not
actually have to prosecute the proposed criminal, just investigate the matter.184
8.10. Enforcement of State Co-operation
Part 9 of the Statute address the interaction between the ICC and states in questions like arrest
and transfer of subjects and investigation by the Court on state territory. Obtaining custody of the
accused as well as necessary evidence can be a big problem in establishing the ICC’s legitimacy
if there is a lack of support from powerful states. On the state parties’ territories, the Court will
have no capacity to operate independently and will have to work through the domestic authorities
and be subject to national law.185 The Statute obligates its parties in Articles 86-88 to co-operate
fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes, which includes handing over
relevant evidence, and it is the responsibility of every state that their domestic legislation provide
for the form of co-operation the Statute requests.186 Reviewing the articles that follows under part
9, one author writes: “the articles (…) are so riddled with exceptions and qualifications that it is
difficult to think of this as anything but an exhortation. The equivocations of the text underscore
the fragile consensus that brought the states of the world together in Rome to approve the
treaty”.187
According to the Statute State Parties must comply with requests from the Court for, for example,
the arrest and surrender of a person, while non-States Parties are under no such obligation.
Surprisingly enough, Article 90 states that a State Party does not have to execute a request from
the Court if the request would require a State to breach a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken
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with respect to another State.188 This seems to leave the State Parties a broad possibility to escape
their obligations to the Court, maybe to satisfy friendly connections with a non-State Party with
interest in the specific request.189 If a couple of states chose to stand outside of the ICC’s
jurisdiction, these can make perfect refuges for persons the ICC wish to prosecute. If evidence is
located or in the possession of one of these states, the ICC cannot expect to take part of it.190
Even if it is a party to the statute that refuses to provide necessary support, the mechanisms to
enforce state co-operation are very limited. The Statute provides the Court with “authority to
make requests to State Parties for co-operation” and if the state fails, the ICC can make a finding
and if it please, report it to the Assembly of State Parties, and to the SC if the council referred the
case to the Court.191
9. THE US OPPOSITION
In voting no to the statute, the USA joined the likes of China, Libya, Iraq, Israel, Qatar and
Yemen.192 The fact that the world’s only remaining superpower voted against the ICC is
regrettable because the Rome Statute lays the foundation for a remarkably important international
instrument and the USA holds an important position in the world community. As one delegate to
the Rome negotiations commented: “You cannot have a court of universal jurisdiction without the
world’s major military power on board”.193 The USA was an active participator in the Rome
negotiations and had significant influence on the final Statute. Although efforts had been taken to
accommodate the United States’ concerns during the conference, the end-result wasn’t
compatible with the US position in a few obviously crucial aspects. Therefore the American
delegation expressed itself incapable of adopting the statute. The US had strongly supported the
establishment of both the ICTY and the ICTR, but this didn’t translate into supporting an
international criminal court194, where US nationals would be liable for prosecution. The US main
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disappointment was the exclusion of UN Security Council control, which would have given the
USA an iron-clad veto authority over the prosecutions and consequently the opportunity to
consent to the ICC on a case-to-case basis. One Author writes: “a key obstacle to the ICC is that
its activities could touch on highly political interests over which some states are not willing to
relinquish control, even to facilitate prosecution of international crimes”.195 It is no secret though
that powerful and influential Americans have strongly opposed the court from the beginning in
both Congress and Senate.196
Some of the opposing states are of limited concern since they have limited geographic and
political global influence or are even considered ‘out-law states’. Of the more important ones,
Israel is afraid of unjustified political prosecutions and objects to the assertion in the Statute that
Israeli settlement activity could constitute war crime, and China has always been very protective
of its domestic activities and does not wish to expose itself to international scrutiny.197 The
existence of un-co-operative states will mean that these could be safe havens for indicted
international criminals. The USA itself has previously considered its obligation to extradite
inferior to its sovereignty and its ‘right to grant asylum’.198
The USA has strongly opposed the exposure of American citizens to ICC jurisdiction, pointing at
the special responsibilities of the USA internationally in securing and restoring peace and
security. This unique position of the USA denotes specific vulnerability for the US military
personnel working abroad.199 US opposition has raised a warning finger regarding the future
willingness of the USA to get involved in humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping
operations, if there is a possibility that they can be subjects to ICC scrutiny and a possible target
for vengeful prosecutions. ‘The illogical consequence […] will be to limit severely those lawful,
but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights and
world peace so desperately seek from the Unites States and other military powers’200.
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9.1. The American Service-members Protection Act
The Americans’ scepticism towards a world-order founded on legal principals has led the
Department of Foreign Affairs to move that the American Service-members Protection Act
(ASPA), a law which aims to protect American military personnel from prosecution outside the
USA, should be agreed to201. Thus the USA wants continued freedom to un-reviewably meddle in
foreign affairs even if the meddling do not fall within the scope of international law. It seems as
though the USA will adopt a policy of total non-co-operation with the Court. The suggested law
even goes so far that it has been called “the Hague invasion clause”, since it in principle authorise
the USA to use military force (“any necessary action”) to free Americans that has been brought to
trial at the ICC. If the law is passed it will specifically block US classified information to the
Court as well as bar US military participation in future NATO, UN or other international
peacekeeping operations without an ironclad guarantee that US servicemen will be free from
prosecution. The proposal would also effectively hinder American co-operation with the ICC
regarding arrests and extradition. This could turn the USA into a refuge for persons facing
prosecution202 and the step from non-co-operation to affect other members of the SC to not refer
cases to the Court as well as postpone the cases that do reach it. The ASPA gives a clear picture
of the importance the Americans give the court’s authorisation to remedy war crimes and human
rights-violations and strongly indicates that “American values are both immutable, and inherently
superior to anything the world has to offer”203. It is tragic that the world’s only superpower says it
is defending world democracy and freedom but when put at a standpoint seems to consider
international law to be a complication.204 This behaviour could amount to a violation of “a
general legal duty of all States to co-operate in effective prosecution and prevention of these
crimes. Because it is well established that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-
being of the world, such a policy may also amount to violation of UN Charter duties to maintain
international peace and security and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace.”205
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10. HYPOTHETICAL CASE-STUDY
10.1. The NATO Bombings in Yugoslavia
A number of international lawyers and politicians from several countries considered some of the
NATO bombings in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict to be war crimes and therefore filed a
complaint at the ICTY. The bombings took place from a very high altitude, which meant that the
probability of mis-targeting and civilian casualties was high. The chief prosecutor Louise Arbour
indicated that she was considering an investigation of the charges against NATO officials and
leaders of NATO member states,206 but later reported that there would be “no formal inquiry”.
The statement leaves room to wonder whether there was ever an “informal” investigation in the
matter.207
In order to examine the accuracy of US fears this calls for an investigation of the assumption that
ICC jurisdiction would have covered the NATO bombings during the Kosovo conflict208, and if
so, it would have led to a prosecution against US nationals, presuming that the ICC would have
been in force when the bombings took place.209
On March 24 1999, NATO began bombing fixed and pre-selected targets inside of Yugoslavia.
The campaign lasted during 77 days. Among NATO’s 19 member states, 13210 supported the
bombings with military resources. The US contributed with the greater part of the 1000
aeroplanes that carried out the bomb-attacks, why it is reasonable to presume that the majority of
bombings were carried out by Americans.211
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10.2. Application of the Rome Statute
10.2.1. War Crimes
Article 8 of the Rome Statute contains four categories of war crimes. The first two cover crimes
committed during international conflicts. With the initiation of the NATO bombing, the existing
internal conflict in Kosovo and all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia involving NATO and
Yugoslav forces became an international armed conflict to which these categories apply. The
actions also qualify as actions taken as “part of a policy or plan” (Article 8). The first category
(Article 8:2 (a)) involves grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. These conventions
protect civilians in times of war against dangers arising from military operations. Attackers must
distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects. If a target is somewhere in between -
“a dual target”- the principle of proportionality places a duty on combatants to avoid or minimise
harm to civilians. Attacks may not deliberately set out to kill and maim civilians, or through
negligence disregard their obligations to identify a specific military objective, and make sure they
do not cause disproportionate harm to civilians in attacking it. The second category (Article 8:2
(b)) is based on the Hague Conventions and it regulates the laws and customs that have to be
followed in an international armed conflict.212
10.2.2. Civilian Targets
I will use two specific attacks to study the possibility of a prosecution before the ICC.
10.2.2.1 The Serb Radio and Television headquarters
On April 23 1999, the Serb Radio and Television headquarters in Belgrade was bombed. Sixteen
civilian workers were killed and sixteen were wounded. NATO has stated that it bombed the
television facilities because the Milosevic government used them as a propaganda tool. Such
Radio and TV headquarters is generally considered a “dual target”, but since it is prohibited to
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strike targets in order to silence propaganda, one can question the legitimacy of bombing the
building on more than one ground.213
The prosecutor could apply Article 8:2 (b) (ii) claiming that NATO intentionally attacked
civilians, but Article 8:2 (b) (iv) would probably be more accurate. 8:2 (b) (vi) prohibits
“intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects (…) which would be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”. Considering that the
building was situated in a densely populated urban neighbourhood and the military benefit was
minimal (the broadcasting operation was quickly moved to other facilities) the attack does not
satisfy claims for proportionality. Additionally NATO did not take adequate precautions in
warning civilians before the attack. Since it is not clear that the building was a military target at
all, Article 8:2 (b) (v) could also be applied: “Attacking or bombarding, by what ever means,
towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military
objectives”. This Article does not specifically call for the defendant’s intention to be proved.214
10.2.2. The Chinese Embassy
Article 8:2 (b) (v) could also be used in prosecuting those responsible for bombing the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade on May 7 1999, where three people were killed and at least fifteen injured.
An embassy is nor per se a military aim. NATO said they mistakenly targeted the site using
outdated maps that indicated the building as a Yugoslav arms agency quarters. The prosecutor
could base a prosecution on Article 8:2 (b) (v) claiming gross negligence.215
10.2.3. The Probability of an Investigation to Lead to Prosecution
There is a chance that both of these events could lead to prosecutions at the ICC. This is
presuming that Yugoslavia or the US had signed and ratified the Rome Treaty at the time of the
bombings (and not opted-out of the Statute regarding war crimes) or consented to it ad hoc.216
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In order to start an investigation the case would need to be referred to the ICC prosecutor by a
state party (this is probably not going to be one of the NATO member states supporting the
campaign), or the prosecutor could initiate an investigation proprio motu.217 The probability of
the SC referring such a case is zero because of US, France and Great Britain veto.218 If the
prosecutor would find reasonable basis to proceed he or she first has to convince the Pre-Trial
Chamber of this in order to receive authorisation to launch an investigation.219 Note though that
the Rome Statute contains very strict definitions of crimes and that only the most serious crimes
of global concern will be prosecuted, not to mention that the NATO campaigns had very broad
global support. Secondly, the prosecutor has to give notice to the concerned states according to
the principle of complementarity.220 The call for admissibility means that the US can easily
eliminate the prosecutor’s involvement and hinder the case from proceeding before the ICC by
initiating its own investigation. There is nothing preventing a state from opening an investigation
for the sole purpose of hindering the ICC prosecutor from making further inquiries, as long as it
appears to be genuine and not a sham.221
If the US for some unlikely reason was unwilling or unable to investigate the case against the
Americans, the SC can still defer the prosecutor’s work at any time by adopting a request for that
purpose. Although the motion must pass by a majority vote of the entire 15 members SC, it seems
fairly certain that the United States and the other NATO states present could use its influence to
get a deferral. The deferral ability is very powerful since the Statute admits it to be renewed
without limits, which means the SC theoretically and lawfully may delay the prosecutor’s
investigation indefinitely.222
Only thereafter can the prosecutor commence an investigation. If it leads to a prosecution, he or
she must present the case before a second panel and convince it that sufficient grounds exist for
prosecution and jurisdiction.223
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11. ANALYSIS
11.1. The Lack of Legal Remedies in the Inter State System
Despite the large number of international criminal conventions, states’ adherence to them so far
has been dismal. Ultimately, states have been very reluctant to forgo the incidents of sovereignty
they enjoy under a realist system of international relations and submit themselves and their
nationals to any sort of independent monitoring or enforcement of conventions by international
institutions. The trend when drafting conventions has been to leave undefined or provide only
limited criminal jurisdiction. When conventions do provide for criminal accountability, their
observance has been uneven, unreliable and consequently lacked legal security. Malekian writes
that the “overriding influence of power politics on the system of international legal order can be
regarded as one of the essential reasons for the non-applicability of the system of international
criminal law to certain states”.224 There have been no meaningful remedies under international
law and perpetrators have gone free since national courts lack resources, but foremost political
will to prosecute offenders of international crimes.
It is common that international crimes have been committed with the approval of or at the direct
request from a government. Thus it is unlikely that the same government would consent to
adjudication of its nationals for participating or following orders. One example is the Leipzig
trials before German Courts after World War I, which are considered to be lacking in many
elements required by the rule of law. But can a national court be expected to prosecute nationals
that have acted on behalf of the national government and country? The drafters in Rome managed
to avoid the dependency of formal state consent to the Court’s jurisdiction on every occasion.
Theoretically the ICC will be able to undertake prosecutions without, and even against, the
political support of the most powerful states. One author writes that this “depoliticizes the
enforcement of international criminal law”225 However, practically, the whole existence of the
ICC is based on state co-operation, which has the potential of substantially weaken the Court’s
chances of being effective.
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11.2. The problem with enforcement
While the establishment of the ICC takes international law one step closer to bringing the
perpetrators of the world’s most serious crimes to justice, it fails to establish a strong basis for
accomplishing this goal. The criminal tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been described
as failures because of their inability to force search, arrest and assistance in sentencing. Both the
ICTY and ICTR have had difficulties pursuing their respective aims due to failure to
“spontaneously achieve or coerce international co-operation from individual states”.226 Neither of
them has had any real power to enforce assistance, even though states have consented to co-
operate with SC actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the tribunals’ respective
statutes require all state parties to fully co-operate.227
International law is often in situations where it is influenced by, or even competes with, interests
of politics and state sovereignty. To have an efficient system of international law, there must exist
mechanisms capable of enforcing that law, even against the political will of powerful states.
“Otherwise, the “law” is no more than a code of civility that exists at the whim of each
independent nation-state. (…) Law without enforcement relies on the altruistic nature of nation-
states to peaceably co-exist in a world where economic scarcity and power struggles
predominate.”228 History (not least the ICTY and ICTR) has shown us that law without
enforcement is destined to fail. Unfortunately this matter is not appropriately addressed in the
drafting of the ICC. Analogous to the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the Rome Statute obligates
states to co-operate with the ICC but the Court has no mechanisms of enforcement to see to that
they do. The Court cannot compel states to comply with its orders, its only course of action is to
report non-compliance to the Assembly of States Parties. The ICC will, like most international
institutions today, be relying on states’ voluntary or coerced co-operation in, for example, the
capture of indicted criminals and gathering of evidentiary matters. On the territory of a state
party, the Court will have no capacity to operate independently and will have to work through the
domestic authorities and under national law. Consequently it will, to an extent, be unavoidably
vulnerable to the political interests of each state. The Court will only work effectively in a world
where states are willing to let their nationals be prosecuted for international crimes and eager to
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assist the ICC in the implementation and enforcement of international law. By founding an
international criminal court without mechanisms to enforce its aims, the world community has
basically left states free to neglect their international liabilities -again. Penrose writes: “left to
their own desires and devices, nation-states will continue to pursue their own self-interests at the
cost of enforcing international law.”229 I cannot name any existing formal legal system in the
world today except for the interstate one, where enforcement is not considered vital for criminal
law observance.
It is dismal and depressing that the world community would establish an international criminal
court to ease its conscience over its dormancy in situations like Rwanda and Yugoslavia, but
leave it in a position where its lack of the necessary independence and power may lead to its
ineffectiveness. One author writes: “As with other international organizations, and like the United
Nations, the independent action of the ICC depends upon its ability to effectively operate
independently of the political interests of the states which bring it into existence. If the ICC must
rely on state cooperation, its success, for example, in obtaining custody of an individual present
in an uncooperative state, will inevitably depend upon that state’s self-interest; where the interests
coincide, the ICC will succeed.”230 The US concerns regarding the Court’s establishment does not
stem from what can be considered the ICC’s shortcomings in effecting justice, such as the
problem of ensuring state co-operation. Rather, the United States’ main objection to the Court is
its intrusion on US sovereignty and the Statute’s insufficient protection of US interests.231 The
majority of nation-states, with the USA in the front, are, in spite of the obvious need for an
efficient international criminal court, still reluctant to risk the consequences of international
criminal enforcement.
11.3. American Fears and Unilateralism
It is nevertheless the case that many aspects of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the ICC
pose a great challenge to the current structure of international law and politics, where the United
States exercises a heretofore unchallenged hegemony. No doubt US objections to the Court are
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unwarranted.232 For example, the Americans’ fear that the Rome Statute was adopted against a
backdrop of antagonism toward the United States, and that cases against the USA will be referred
to the ICC by malevolent states for politically motivated reasons. Quite aside from the regrettable
fact that most international law these days is politics, this concern of the US is a simplification of
the mechanisms of justice provided in the statute, and the extremely remote possibility of turning
vengeful plotting into successful prosecution before the ICC. The fears are exaggerated and
probably shade a deeper concern: that the US simply does not want an independent and powerful
supra-national organisation to threaten US foreign policy and sovereignty. The Americans refuse
to submit their military actions to the scrutiny of an international court, where they cannot use a
veto to condition the consent to adjudication. One American author proposes that in order to
produce a court free from politicization, it should be responsible to a higher authority, preferably
to the five permanent Security Council members.233 How that is reconcilable I do not know.
Apparently there is an American belief that the US has an inherent right to lead the world and
accordingly could serve as a higher authority to a supra-national body.
Indisputably, many US actions are of a defensive or retaliatory nature, caused by ‘disregarded’
states, and supported often both politically and physically, by the global majority of other
states.234 If Americans working abroad do not violate international law there is no crime to
prosecute and no need to worry about the ICC. But if Americans do violate international law
using strong arm-tactics in pursue of non-supported American interests, and commit serious
crimes under the ICC jurisdiction, why wouldn’t they be held responsible for their actions like all
other nationals of the world? “The sense that the United States has a special moral status and
mission has resulted in an intensive engagement by the United States in foreign affairs, predicated
on a belief that America has a unique mission to lead the world”235 but “American unilateralism
reflects a mistaken belief that the United States can be assumed always to operate on the basis of
principle-derived autopilot”236! Why would Americans be immune from standards applicable to
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the rest of the global community?237 One of the most important notions of Rule of Law is that all
are equally bound and protected by law. We cannot allow power to determine what is lawful.
Many of the Americans’ objections are of minor significance. As demonstrated in the case study,
the Statute adopted in Rome heavily restricts ICC operation through extensive procedural
safeguards and many of these can be traced back to US proposals and were implemented to
alleviate the American fears. In fact much of the Statute reflect US interests and influence. As
shown, the Statute gives proof of a rather complex and burdensome procedural operation and the
likelihood of politically motivated but unfounded cases finding their way through all the
safeguards is next to nothing. The risk of abuse is significantly minimised, unfortunately the
protection provisions seem to have also minimised the chances of a truly effective Court. The
USA participated in the promotion and development of many of the Court’s deficiencies. These
provide excellent mechanisms for non-supportive states and will very likely hamper the efficient
functioning of the Court. Because of the American delegation the Court were granted much
weaker jurisdiction than it conceivably should have retained and then the delegation left the
Rome conference without signing the treaty.238
11.4. Concluding Remarks
We must begin somewhere in order to put an end to the atrocities that take place in our world.
What could be a better start than to simply enforce the laws prohibiting crimes that the
international community has already agreed the existence and illegality of?
For states to be encouraged to co-operate with the ICC it needs legitimacy in the eyes of its
subjects – the states. One component of legitimacy is the effectiveness of the institution, which in
turn depends upon state co-operation. I have mentioned the precarious “feedback loop”:
effectiveness encourages legitimacy, which encourages state co-operation, which increases
effectiveness and so on. 139 individual signing parties to the treaty and 42 ratifying states so far
indicates widespread international support. Their “for” votes obviously stand for a general
agreement with and belief in the normative aims of the Court. The depth of this commitment is
yet unknown. The ICC’s legitimacy will depend on its effectiveness in fulfilling its aims. This is
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essential for it to attract global support and co-operation in order to build a record of success and
credibility. The rule of law, when defined in the abstract, is said to require certainty and
consistency of enforcement as one of the elements of its existence. The lack of enforcement
mechanisms has the potential to undermine the otherwise theoretically strong efficacy based on
the Court’s institutional structure and definition of crimes. In general, I think we can conclude
that the ICC accommodates the legitimate interests of the world community. In theory it has the
potential of producing impartial and equal adjudication by an independent judiciary, based on
already recognised international crimes. But if states feel there is no international equality,
common interests and mutual respect, they will not want to submit themselves to regulations that
will impact on their freedom and political achievement.239
How effectively the ICC will be able to exercise its granted jurisdiction will be dependent on the
world community and the prevailing politics at the moment. I am afraid that early failures will
strongly reduce the ICC’s chances of establishing its legitimacy. There would then be a real risk
that the ICC would wind away into semi-irrelevance. The lack of enforcement mechanisms
“underscore the fragile consensus that brought the States of the world together in Rome to
approve the Treaty; indeed it suggests that while States agree to the establishment of the Court in
principle, and even to its jurisdiction in theory, they are not willing to make the concessions to
international cooperation that are needed to make the Court a success in practice”.240 States are
not prepared to change the relatively ad hoc, almost voluntary system into a mandatory one. The
ICC could come to rectify, but if worst come to worst merely perpetuate, the inefficiency that has
long characterised the system of international criminal law.241 International law is constrained on
the one side by the requirement in most cases of states’ consent, and on the other side by the
global political situation at the moment. Even though there needs to be interaction between law
and politics, “law must not fall casualty to the politics of the moment, or law will simply become
a spurious and reactionary attempt to deal with politically sensitive issues”242.
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The institution’s effectiveness and consequently its legitimacy will hinge on what support the
most influential states will give it. The fact that the world’s only remaining superpower voted
against the ICC is regrettable because the USA holds an important position in the world
community. The Court is unlikely to be effective without US support and participation. The
Americans can undermine the otherwise widely recognised treaty by withholding information and
refusing to extradite criminals. The League of Nations failed without US membership and the UN
is often paralysed due to lack of US co-operation.243 It is not impossible that the ICC will subsist
without US support but there is no doubt American participation would be of great significance
both symbolically and economically. This is especially true seeing as the US can be expected to
be involved in most of the international conflicts of significance. The US non-co-operation,
which is best understood as proxy for the American’s claim about the appropriate distribution of
political power244, will surely affect the perception and legitimacy of the Court and international
law’s ability to enforce compliance. One could hope that it would instead raise questions about
US commitment to international humanitarian law, the correctness of US power politics and
American exceptionalism –“a belief that the United States has a unique mission to lead the world,
but ought logically to be exempt from the rules it promotes”245. There are many signs in the world
today of a prevailing unilateral self-interest “increasing propensity of powerful states to
withdraw, formally or in practice, from the multilateral legal enterprise”246 as it suits them. This
seems to mean that “the US can pick and choose the international conventions and laws that serve
its purpose and reject those that do not. Call it internationalism a la carte”.247 Absolute
sovereignty should be a dying maxim. Nowadays, states regularly give up sovereignty in order to
achieve something more important for the community as a whole, both for economic, ideological
and political ends. Maybe the creation of the ICC will lead to a proper allocation of political
authority. If the vast majority of states in the world show a commitment in the Court, the political
pressure on non-co-operative nations will become quite strong. At least the hindering of US to
recreate its special status according to the UN Charter in Rome shows some steps in this
direction.
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As we race forward to ratify the Rome Statute I think it is prudent that we consider exactly why
we are creating an international criminal court and what we want it to achieve. The ICC is
potentially the last great international institution of the Twentieth Century. We may not have the
solutions for hindering war, conflicts and violations against human rights (the underlying historic,
ethnic, religious and territorial reasons behind antagonisms are not easily disregarded), but we do
have the ability to enforce the laws of war and human rights, and punish the perpetrators of these
laws. A key hope will be that the existence of the ICC itself will deter future atrocities although it
is beyond the scope of this essay to consider the strength of such deterrence. What is for certain is
that the mere existence of the ICC serves as a normative marker that the world will no longer
allow the perpetrators of the worst atrocities known to history to live out their lives and write
their memoirs. However, as presently structured, the ICC has the disadvantage of being the
adjudicator in a system of law without enforcement mechanisms. Without real power to coerce
recalcitrant states to comply with its orders it will not be able to perform its duties in a
meaningful fashion. We need to put international law above self-interest politics and state
sovereignty, and a prerequisite to assure respect for the law is enforcement. The establishment of
a permanent international criminal court is far from realisation of a practical success, but
nevertheless a major step in the right direction.
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